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EQUAL VOICE BY HALF MEASURES
John Mark Hansen* †

Introduction
In democratic theory, the ballot is the most perfect expression of the
democratic commitment to the moral equality of persons. Every citizen,
whether old or young, rich or poor, sophisticated or simple, enjoys the same
endowment in an election: a single vote. The ballot not only gives citizens
their voice in government, it also makes their voices equal.
In practice, however, democracies have erected all sorts of impediments
to the ideal of equal voice, such as restrictions on suffrage, legislative
malapportionments, and discriminatory gerrymanders. Among the most
egregious impediments, however, are surely the systems of indirect election
purported to filter and to refine the voice of the people. The Electoral College is one such system. This Commentary examines the effects of that
system and the proposed reforms to it on the prospect of equal voice in elections.
I. The Electoral College Now
The Electoral College effectively divides the selection of the president
into fifty-one separate elections in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. In every state except two, state electorates choose slates of electors
pledged to support the winner of the statewide popular vote. Like all winnertake-all electoral systems, the Electoral College is exceedingly responsive:
small changes in voter support magnify into large mandates in the Electoral
College. Moreover, like all electoral systems divided into geographic districts, the Electoral College exhibits a representational bias, in that a
candidate who falls well short of a majority of the popular vote can still win
the presidency. Electoral College anomalies of this kind have occurred in
four out of the fifty-five presidential elections held since 1789—and most
recently in 2000.
Because the number of electoral votes for each state equals the size of
its congressional delegation and the House of Representatives is apportioned
roughly in proportion to population, the weighting of votes in presidential
elections is not as grossly unequal as in U.S. Senate elections, where a sin* Dean of Social Sciences and Charles L. Hutchinson Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science, University of Chicago.
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gle voter in the least-populous state, Wyoming, has sixty-eight times the
power of a voter in the most-populous state, California. But the inequality in
the value of each vote in the Electoral College is still considerable. In the
five states with the largest electorates, the number of residents of voting age
per electoral vote ranges from 445,500 in Pennsylvania to 486,400 in Florida. Meanwhile, in the five least-populous states, the ratio of voting age
population to electoral votes ranges from 124,300 in Wyoming to 160,700 in
Vermont. Thus, in the Electoral College, a vote cast in a less populated state
is worth three to four times as much as a vote cast in a highly populated
state. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not
allow such extreme deviations from the “one person, one vote” standard in
legislative apportionment, they are perfectly tolerated in the apportionment
of the Electoral College.
The Electoral College induces a second kind of inequality just as troublesome as the first: inequality of attention. The political arithmetic of the
Electoral College encourages presidential campaigns to focus their efforts
on states with a close partisan balance, whether large or small in population.
In recent years, Florida (twenty-seven electoral votes), Ohio (twenty), New
Hampshire (four), and New Mexico (five) have been the object of much solicitous attention. Meanwhile, except for fundraising visits, campaigns have
slighted California (fifty-five) and Texas (thirty-four). And it has been decades since presidential nominees waged a vigorous contest for Kansas (six)
or Rhode Island (four). From March to October 2004, George W. Bush and
John Kerry combined to make forty-nine visits to Ohio, forty-six to Florida,
forty-one to Pennsylvania, thirty-four to Wisconsin, and twenty-six to
Iowa—but the candidates visited California only eight times. In the same
election, voters in twenty-eight states, including California, Texas, New
York, Illinois, New Jersey, and Georgia, saw fewer than 100 campaign advertisements per month over the entire course of the campaign, while voters
in the swing states viewed an order of magnitude more. Judging by the two
campaigns’ efforts, a majority of the 200 million citizens eligible to vote in
2004 were not seriously solicited for their votes.
The inequality of attention has two consequences for equality of voice.
First, where campaigns concentrate their efforts influences who turns out to
vote. Campaigns mobilize voters both as a direct strategy—through get-outthe-vote efforts—and as an indirect consequence of the excitement and
commitment they generate. Indeed, the closely-fought 2004 campaign
stimulated the largest increase in voter turnout in four decades, a gain of 5.8
percentage points over 2000. The increase, however, was concentrated in the
battleground states. Every one of the ten states still “in play” in October—as
judged by advertising buys—posted increases in voter participation that well
exceeded the national average.
Second, where campaigns concentrate their efforts affects who sets the
campaigns’ issue agendas. As a first-term president, George W. Bush departed
from Republican free-trade principles to impose duties on imported steel and
softwood timber, actions of keen interest in Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Ohio, Washington, and Oregon. As a candidate in 2004, John Kerry found it
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necessary to establish his bona fides as a friend of gun owners by taking
time off from the campaign trail to hunt pheasants in Iowa. The Republicans
allegedly whipped up gay marriage referenda to mobilize religious conservatives in eleven states including Arkansas, Ohio, Michigan, and Oregon. To
be sure, the parochial concerns of the swing states did not monopolize the
two campaigns’ agendas; the war in Iraq, health care, and terrorism each
received thorough discussion. Still, the Electoral College pushed the special
concerns of voters in a handful of highly competitive states ahead of the
concerns of the vast majority of the citizens whose misfortune it was not to
live in Ohio or Iowa.
In sum, the Electoral College violates the principle of equal voice that is
fundamental to elections as an institution. It favors the preferences of some
voters over others by as much as a factor of four, based only on the happenstance of the population of the state in which they reside. Even more
dramatically, it distorts the process by which presidential candidates attend
to the wishes of the voters. The Electoral College encourages—yea, demands—that candidates attach nearly exclusive importance to the
preferences and involvement of voters living in closely divided states.
II. Proposals for Electoral College Reform
The consideration of equal voice is essential to evaluating the different
proposals for Electoral College reform. Reforms can hardly be justified
apart from their effects on equality, a paramount value in a democracy.
Equality is particularly important in discussing the most likely prospect for
reform: awarding two “senatorial” electoral votes to the overall winner of
the state as well as one electoral vote to the popular vote winner within each
of the state’s congressional districts. By aligning the electoral vote more
closely with the popular vote in each state, the proposal would appear to
improve the prospects for equal voice. But the proposal contains less for
political equality than meets the eye.
First, in a purely mechanical sense, the proposal to allocate electoral
votes by congressional district does nothing to address the existing bias in
favor of voters in less populated states. Every state still gets a minimum of
three electoral votes, even tiny Wyoming, with a voting-eligible population
about the size of Denver’s.
Worse, by making little difference in the states with the smallest populations, the proposal may in fact aggravate the bias against voters in the states
with large populations. It would not alter the winner-take-all method of allocation for the eight states with a single statewide congressional district and
three electoral votes. Moreover, the partisan balances in smaller states are so
lopsided that only six of the thirteen states with four to six electoral votes
might actually split them.
But in the states with the largest populations, the proposal would have a
greater effect—probably for the negative. The reform might bring competition to areas that are not now contested at the state level, as I will discuss
momentarily. But in the more populous states that are currently competitive in
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presidential elections, the proposal would markedly reduce their value as a
prize and diminish campaigns’ willingness to invest their resources there.
Were electoral votes allocated by congressional district, the one-sided partisan composition of most districts would cause Democrats and Republicans
to compete for eight rather than twenty-seven electoral votes in Florida and
for five rather than ten electoral votes in Wisconsin. The winner-take-all
tradition of the Electoral College took hold precisely as a strategy to increase individual states’ leverage in the presidential election process.
Allocating electoral votes by congressional district would diminish the influence of highly populated states far more than less-populated states and in
that way affect the more populous states—and equality of voice—for the
worse.
On the other hand, one might assume that putting congressional districts
into play would encourage presidential candidates to broaden the reach of
their campaign efforts to include more people in more places, thus stimulating voter turnout and attending to more numerous and more diverse
constituencies. Perhaps it would. But such an improvement in competitiveness—and in political equality—is hardly guaranteed.
Suppose, to make a back-of-the-envelope calculation, that we take as a
measure of competitiveness a presidential election decided by a plurality of
less than ten percent of votes cast. By this standard, twenty-one states with
264 total electoral votes were competitive in the 2004 election, and indeed,
twenty-two states—mostly, but not entirely, the same ones—drew the attention of campaign advertisers at some point in the 2004 campaign.
Against this standard, what might have been the effect of a rule to award
one electoral vote for each congressional district and two for each state in
the 2004 election? George W. Bush and John Kerry ran within ten percentage points of each other in ninety-five of the 435 congressional districts.
Sixty-three of the ninety-five competitive districts were in states that were
already competitive according to the ten point standard, leaving just thirtytwo districts in which campaigns might have invested resources they did not
put into the state. Among the thirty-two, of course, were significant numbers
of districts in states that drew absolutely no attention in the 2004 campaign,
including nine (of twenty-nine) in New York, five (of nineteen) in Illinois,
three (of five) in Connecticut, and three (of five) in Arizona. By this measure, the proposed reform would have increased the number of electoral votes
in play by about twelve percent.
While the campaigns might step up their activities in the thirty-two
newly competitive congressional districts under the proposed rule, they
might equally reduce their efforts in the twenty-one states that had been
competitive under the old rule. As already noted, the abolition of winnertake-all vastly diminishes the value of winning each state, from, for instance, 20 electoral votes to 2 for Ohio, or collectively, from 264 electoral
votes in 21 competitive states to 42. Further, because the overwhelming majority of congressional districts are uncompetitive even in two-party
competitive states, the proposed allocation also would drastically narrow the
field in which campaigns need to make intense efforts to win votes. The
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campaigns might take the resources formerly devoted to intense efforts to
win 264 electoral votes in 21 competitive states and turn them instead to
concerted efforts to win 95 competitive congressional districts with real but
diminished efforts to win 42 senatorial electoral votes in the 21 competitive
states. By this reckoning, the proposed reform would have reduced contestation by as much as forty-eight percent in 2004. Thus, it is by no means
obvious that this step is in the right direction, either for competition or for
equality.
Conclusion
This analysis suggests that the equality central to democratic theory and
democratic practice cannot be achieved by half measures. If we want every
vote to count equally, the only solution is to elect the president by direct
popular vote. The chief executive is the only officer of the federal government who is responsible to the citizenry at large, and we cannot ensure
equal responsiveness if one citizen’s vote counts for three or four times as
much as another’s. Likewise, if we want every citizen to have an equal
chance to enjoy the ministrations of at least one of the presidential candidates, the only solution is to elect the president by direct popular vote. Only
a national popular vote gives campaigns the incentive to seek support in
places and among demographics they will probably lose—or win decisively.
Were presidents elected by the nation at large, Democratic candidates would
have a reason to campaign intensively among poor Latinos in south Texas,
while Republicans would be motivated to appeal nationwide to Latinos who
might be attracted by the party’s stand on social issues; similarly, Republicans would have a reason to mobilize white-collar commuters in
Connecticut, while Democrats would be motivated to rally the prairie populists who still dot the Great Plains.
In short, citizens have equal voice only when every vote counts. And
every vote counts only when candidates must seek support from all voters,
no matter the partisan predispositions of their neighbors and no matter
where they live.

